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CORRECTING MANDATORY INJUSTICE:
JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
JOANNA M. HUANG†
ABSTRACT
In 1987, the United States political and social systems lost trust in
the judiciary and severely limited its authority by enacting the
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. During this period, many
judges were forced to impose sentences they viewed as unjust. Trust in
the judiciary was restored in 2005, when United States v. Booker
made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Despite the increase in
judicial discretion, however, judges are still unable to correct
sentences imposed during the intervening eighteen years because
Booker does not apply retroactively. Unfortunately, the executive and
legislative branches are similarly unable to provide adequate
remedies. Congressional action is insufficient because it is inflexible,
time consuming, and generally nonretroactive. Executive clemency
appears more promising due to a flexible and broad nature that
allows the president and state governors to pardon or commute
sentences at will. But executives have become unwilling to use their
clemency power, making it an inadequate remedy. This Note
proposes a solution that overcomes the limitations of the current
system: judicial recommendation of executive clemency. This solution
produces three benefits. First, it provides judges with a discretionary
tool to reduce disproportionate mandatory sentences. Second, it
revitalizes the exercise of clemency by giving it additional legitimacy.
Finally, it refocuses clemency grants on the defendant and the facts of
the case rather than on political influences. This Note provides eight
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illustrative criteria for judicial recommendation of executive clemency
that, together, combine the characteristics of three modern cases in
which the sentencing judges recommended clemency. This Note seeks
to explain how and why each criterion might be important, taking into
consideration the goals of judicial discretion, executive clemency, and
the criminal justice system overall.

INTRODUCTION
As a society, we trust the judiciary to be a fair and objective
arbiter of justice. Article III of the U.S. Constitution contains the
clause “[t]he judicial Power of the United States[] shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish,” which establishes the federal
1
judicial system. This vesting of power was unanimously approved at
2
the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Not only is the judiciary
3
independent from the other branches of government, but it is also
entrusted with the authority to review congressional and presidential
4
actions. Yet, for eighteen years prior to the Supreme Court’s 2005
5
decision in United States v. Booker, the United States’ political and
social systems lost trust in the judiciary and severely limited its
authority by enacting the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines
6
(Sentencing Guidelines). During this period of “mandatory
7
injustice,” many judges were forced to impose sentences they viewed

1. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
2. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) (resolving in 1787 to establish a national judiciary).
3. To achieve independence of judgment, Article III of the Constitution gives federal
judges life tenure, allowing them to “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and warrants
that their compensation “not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST.
art III, § 1.
4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
5. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6. The authority to establish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was provided by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
7. While the eighteen years between the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines and the Booker decision may seem too narrow a focus to warrant serious
consideration, a sample of federal justice statistics proves otherwise. In just the eleven years
from 1993 to 2004, an estimated 502,228 individuals were sentenced to prison. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Publications and Products: Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4 (last revised May 5, 2010) (providing links to
annual reports containing sentencing statistics).
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as unjust: some were disproportionate to the severity of the crimes,
and others were unequal as between codefendants. They found still
others inconsistent as between defendants sentenced before and after
8
the Guidelines became discretionary.
The restoration of trust in the judiciary began in 2005, when
9
Booker made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Despite the
increase in judicial discretion, however, judges are still unable to
correct sentences imposed during the period of mandatory injustice
10
because Booker does not apply retroactively. Furthermore, some
state judges remain similarly bound by state-imposed mandatory
minimum sentences or other inflexible statutes, which create the same
11
mandatory-injustice situation as on the federal level. This Note
therefore also addresses mandatory injustice at the state level.
It may seem that the executive or legislative branches could
remedy mandatory injustice. Congressional action, however, is
insufficient because it is inflexible, time consuming, and generally
12
nonretroactive. Executive clemency appears more promising on
cursory examination: its flexible and broad nature allows the
president and state governors to pardon or commute sentences at
will, including those sentenced during the mandatory-injustice
13
period. Indeed, prior to the Nixon era, executives regularly granted
clemency. In recent years, however, clemency grants have declined
rapidly at both the federal and state levels, coming nearly to a halt.
This is a result of a combination of factors, including the
unreviewable nature of clemency grants, the prevailing public belief
that they represent abuses of power, the increasing popularity of
retributivist theory as a justification for punishment, and the “tough
14
on crime” political trend. Consequently, executives have become
unwilling to use their clemency power, making it an inadequate
8. See infra Part I.
9. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. Current sentencing-reform efforts continue the restoration
process. See, e.g., THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 30–73 (2008)
(recommending a variety of sentencing reform policies); see also id. at 113–17 (recommending
reforms to revitalize the executive pardon power).
10. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31 (2000) (requiring mandatory minimum sentences
for drug offenses); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §333.7403 (2000 & West Supp. 2001) (same); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 60.04 (McKinney 2009) (same).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.B.2.
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solution to the problem of mandatory injustice. In the current state of
the United States’ social, legal, and political systems, none of the
three branches of government can alone correct the results of the
period of mandatory injustice.
This Note proposes a solution that overcomes the limitations of
the current system to correct mandatory injustice: judicial
recommendation of executive clemency. This solution produces three
benefits. First, it provides judges with a discretionary tool to reduce
disproportionate mandatory sentences. Second, it helps revitalize the
exercise of clemency by giving it additional legitimacy. Finally, it
helps to refocus clemency grants on the defendant and the facts of the
case rather than on political influences. In essence, judicial
recommendation of clemency advances the goals of judicial
15
discretion, executive clemency, and the criminal justice system.
When mandatory sentencing schemes result in injustice that judges
cannot correct acting alone, judicial recommendation of executive
clemency is an effective discretionary tool that should be used readily.
Part I lays out the nature of the problem. It describes the decline
in judges’ discretion to formulate and modify sentences. In the early
1800s, judges recommended pardons by writing directly to the
president. Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines,
judges could modify sentences by invoking Rule 35 of the Federal
16
Rules of Criminal Procedure. But in the eighteen years between the
Guidelines’ enactment and Booker, judges lost their discretion in
formulating or modifying sentences. In particular, Part I evaluates the
opposition to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines expressed by judges
17
18
in three cases, namely, United States v. Angelos, United States v.
19
20
Harvey, and United States v. McDade. Part I argues that because

15. See infra Part III.
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
17. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), United States v. Harvey,
946 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1991), and United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2009)
are three of a very few cases, both within federal and state case law, in which judges
recommended clemency. Other examples include United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23, 45–46
(D.D.C. 1961), rev’d on other grounds, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc), and People v.
White, 128 N.Y.S.2d 370, 375 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1953). Because of the lack of literature and study
on judicial recommendation of executive clemency, one can only speculate about the reasons for
such limited case law. Considering the declining exercise of clemency, it is not far-fetched to
impute such a deficiency to the judiciary’s belief, and rightly so, that such recommendations
would yield few results.
18. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004).
19. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1991).
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judges were required by law to impose disproportionate sentences
during the mandatory-injustice period, defendants who were so
sentenced have a genuine need for sentence reduction through a
nonjudicial remedy.
Part II points out the deficiencies of other solutions. Part II.A
describes the practical obstacles of exclusive dependence on
legislative reform, namely its lengthy process and adverseness to
retroactivity. Part II.B first outlines the legal foundation and
procedures of executive clemency and discusses the benefits of
executive clemency to the criminal justice system. Part II.C then
argues that, despite such benefits, waiting for executive action as a
sole means of alleviating the effects of unjust sentences is inadequate
because of clemency’s current stigma.
Part III ties together the discussions in Parts I and II to argue
that more frequent use of executive clemency recommendations by
the judiciary will provide the remedy to mandatory injustice. Part III
then argues that judicial contribution to clemency will counteract at
least some of clemency’s current stigma and will play a role in its
revitalization. As part of this revitalization, judicial recommendation
will also deemphasize political considerations and will refocus the
decision to grant clemency on the particular facts of a defendant’s
case.
Finally, Part IV provides eight illustrative criteria for clemency
recommendation. They are a combination of the characteristics of the
21
three modern cases cited above in which the sentencing judges
recommended clemency. Part IV explains how and why each criterion
might be important, taking into consideration the goals of judicial
discretion, executive clemency, and the criminal justice system
overall.

20. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2009).
21. See supra notes 18–20.
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I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE EXISTENCE OF
MANDATORY INJUSTICE
22

The eighteen years from 1987 to 2005 witnessed an increase in
the number of criminal defendants who received surprisingly harsh
sentences, especially those who had committed nonviolent, victimless
crimes. Consider this: Weldon Angelos was arrested for distribution
23
of marijuana at age twenty-four without any prior criminal history.
Upon Angelos’s refusal of a plea offer, the prosecutor pushed for
three additional charges for guns found in his possession, even though
24
the guns were never used. As a result, the judge reluctantly
25
sentenced him to sixty-one and a half years, making his expected age
of release from prison eighty-five.
Consider another case: Kenneth Harvey was condemned to
spend the rest of his life in prison for possession of crack cocaine at
26
age twenty-four. Harvey had two prior criminal offenses, both of
27
which were nonviolent.
And consider yet another example: Byron McDade, a father of
four young children with two jobs and no criminal history, was
convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, as well as
conspiracy to distribute, and was sentenced to twenty-seven years in
prison after refusing to testify against a friend. His four codefendants,
all with prior serious drug convictions, pled guilty, testified against
28
him, and each received less than seven and a half years.
The judges in all three cases lamented the injustice of the
sentences they were required to impose pursuant to the then-

22. The mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were enacted in 1984. See supra note 6.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission first published a Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual in
1987, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987), and has published one
annually since, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009) [hereinafter 2009
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. Booker, making the Guidelines advisory, was decided in 2005. See
supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
23. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1230.
26. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1377–78 (8th Cir. 1991).
27. Id.
28. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79, 86 (D.D.C. 2009). McDade was
sentenced by Judge Friedman on May 29, 2002. Id. at 79. This opinion, ruling on McDade’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, came after an evidentiary hearing on January 15, 2008.
Id. at 78.
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29

mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. What could the judiciary do, if
30
anything, to correct this “malfunction[]” in the system?
Historically, if a judge found himself bound by law to issue an
unjust sentence, he would write directly to the president to pray for
31
“an act of grace.” The exercise of the president’s executive-clemency
32
power was a “regular practice.” For example, between 1801 and
1829, of the 596 defendants sentenced in federal court, 148 were
33
pardoned. Prior to the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987, judges could reduce terms of imprisonment post34
35
sentencing after a “sober second look,” pursuant to Rule 35.
Although Rule 35 was still available to judges during the mandatoryinjustice period, it was inapplicable if the “sober second look” took
them to below either the Guidelines’ sentencing range or the
36
statutory minimum.
The Supreme Court made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in
its 2005 Booker decision, holding that “the provision of the federal
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . [is]
37
incompatible with today’s constitutional holding.” Following
Booker, judges regained discretionary power in sentencing to avoid

29. See Harvey, 946 F.2d at 1378 (noting that the sentencing judge was “troubled” at being
required to impose a life sentence); McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (calling the defendant’s
sentence “disproportionate”); Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (describing the defendant’s
sentence as “unjust, disproportionate to his offense, demeaning to victims of actual criminal
violence—but nonetheless constitutional”).
30. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
31. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 37, 61 (2006) (noting that, even in cases in which mandatory sentences applied, judges
could recommend executive clemency); George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love,
Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16
FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 213 (2004) (describing methods whereby judges would petition the
President for clemency).
32. Lardner & Love, supra note 31, at 220 n.20.
33. DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, at 46–47 (1985).
34. Cf. Carol. S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 402 (1995)
(applying a “sober second look” in the context of capital punishment).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (“Within 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (“The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, [of the Sentencing Guidelines] . . . .”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
367 (1989) (“[Section 3553] makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding on the
courts.”).
37. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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injustice. The only period, therefore, during which they completely
lacked authority to correct disproportionate sentences was between
the enactment of the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and Booker,
38
spanning the eighteen years from 1987 to 2005.
Unfortunately, this period of mandatory injustice continues to
manifest its influence. Absent a remedy, Angelos, Harvey, and
McDade must serve out, in their entireties, sentences that the
39
sentencing judges believed were excessive. All three sentencing
judges recognized the gravity of the situation and searched for a
solution. Judge Paul Cassell, Angelos’s sentencing judge, “believe[d]
that to sentence Mr. Angelos to prison for the rest of his life is unjust,
40
cruel, and even irrational.” He further expressed his exasperation
that the sentence “is also far in excess of the sentence imposed for
such serious crimes as aircraft hijacking, second degree murder,
espionage, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape. It exceeds what
recidivist criminals will likely serve under the federal ‘three strikes’
41
provision.” Yet the judge in the end “reluctantly conclude[d] that
42
[he had] no choice but to impose the 55 year sentence.” Harvey’s
sentencing judge, Chief Judge Howard Sachs, “was troubled by the
necessity of imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without release
on Harvey . . . [because] ‘the prior drug offenses, although felonies,
were not deemed serious enough to merit imprisonment and appear
43
to be only technically within the statutory punishment plan.’”
Finally, Judge Paul Friedman, McDade’s sentencing judge, wrote that
the sentence imposed is “disproportionate” and “[h]ad the Sentencing
Guidelines been advisory in 2002, or if Booker were retroactive now,
the Court would vary substantially from the Guideline sentence of
38. Booker does not apply retroactively to cases that became final before it was decided on
January 12, 2005. Duncan v. United States, 552 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 890
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2005); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 144
(2d Cir. 2005); Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 615–16 (3d Cir. 2005); Varela v. United
States, 400 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2005); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th
Cir. 2005).
39. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
40. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004).
41. Id.
42. Id. The fifty-five years are the punishment for three counts of gun possession.
Angelos’s total sentence includes an additional six and a half years for the drug conviction. Id. at
1232.
43. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Sachs, C.J., from
the Sentencing Transcript).
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324 months. This Court, however, is without authority to reduce
44
McDade’s sentence at this juncture.”
Under these circumstances, in which the judiciary was without
legal recourse to correct unjust sentences imposed by the thenmandatory Sentencing Guidelines, all three judges resorted to one
final appeal for the defendants—executive clemency. Judge Cassell
put forth his recommendation:
While I must impose the unjust sentence, our system of separated
powers provides a means of redress. . . . In my mind, this is one of
those rare cases where the system has malfunctioned. . . . One of the
purposes of executive clemency is “to afford relief from undue
harshness.” . . . Given that the President has the exclusive power to
commute sentences, . . . is it appropriate for me to make a
commutation recommendation to the President[?] Having carefully
reviewed the issue, I believe that such a recommendation is entirely
proper. The President presumably wants the fullest array of
information regarding cases in which a commutation might be
appropriate. Moreover, the Executive Branch has indicated that it
actively solicits the views of sentencing judges on pardon and
45
commutation requests.

With respect to Harvey, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Chief Judge
Sachs’s recommendation for executive clemency, stating that “[a]s the
Supreme Court noted in Harmelin, executive clemency is one of the
‘flexible techniques’ for modifying sentences. The existence of these
techniques is one reason for the Supreme Court’s holding that the
type of sentence imposed in this case does not violate the Eighth
46
Amendment.” Similarly, Judge Friedman “urge[d] the President to
consider executive clemency for McDade and to reduce McDade’s
47
sentence.” When judges strongly disagree with the sentences they
are required to impose, the reasons for their disagreement deserve
attention.
This Note argues that when sentencing judges or other judges
reviewing a case believe the sentence imposed on the defendant to be
overly severe, they should follow the leadership of Judges Cassell,
Sachs, and Friedman and recommend executive clemency. The next
Part explores legislative reform and executive clemency without a
44.
45.
46.
47.

United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009).
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (footnotes omitted).
Harvey, 946 F.2d at 1378 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991)).
McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86.

HUANG IN FINAL

140

9/15/2010 11:54:40 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:131

judicial recommendation and concludes that these measures cannot
adequately correct the problem of mandatory injustice.
II. UNAVAILABLE REMEDIES: LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY WITHOUT JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION
A. Legislative Reform
Legislatures are an effective channel for creating lasting changes
in the law to prevent future injustice on a large scale. It is important
to have legislative amendments for such a purpose. Legislative action
is not adequate, however, to correct injustices that have already
occurred. The reasons are twofold. First, legislative action takes a
long time, and an inmate may be forced to spend years in prison
48
before a legislature acts. A more expedient means to restore just
sentences to specific defendants in a timely manner is required.
Second, most reforms are not retroactive; indeed, by overturning final
49
judgments, retroactive legislation raises constitutional questions.
Even if legislative reform eventually materializes, due to its

48. See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 858–68 (2008)
(discussing how shifting political control and the interaction between the legislative and judicial
branches can lead to legislative inefficiencies); cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation
Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 14–16 (2009) (“[J]udicial correctives are both undemocratic and inefficient, and . . . our polity
would be better off with a legislative solution to this legislative process dysfunction.”).
49. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“[S]uch legislation bears
not on the problem of interbranch review but on the problem of finality of judicial judgments.”);
id. at 227 (“Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the
judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not
declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other
than what the courts said it was. Finality of a legal judgment is determined by statute, just as
entitlement to a government benefit is a statutory creation; but that no more deprives the
former of its constitutional significance for separation-of-powers analysis than it deprives the
latter of its significance for due process purposes.”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic
Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1104
(2010) (“[Unconstitutional] retroactive legislation began and has been continued, because the
judiciary has thought itself too weak to withstand; too weak, because it has neither the
patronage nor the prestige necessary to sustain it against the antagonism of the legislature and
the bar. . . . Instead of that, it pursued a temporizing course till the mischief had become
intolerable, and till it was compelled . . . to invalidate certain acts of legislation, or rather to
reverse certain legislative decrees. . . . Yet the legislature attempted to divest it, by a general law
it is true, but one impinging on particular rights.” (quoting Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489,
495 (1849))).
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50

adverseness to retroactivity, defendants already sentenced may be
51
left unaided. Legislative action has an eye toward the future; a
retroactive solution, however, is required to solve the problem of
mandatory injustice. Thus, legislative action alone is insufficient to
provide remedies for defendants sentenced prior to Booker. A
flexible instrument like judicially-recommended executive clemency
could be of tremendous assistance to specific offenders.
B. Executive Clemency
To understand why a judge’s role in recommending executive
clemency is critical to providing relief to defendants who were
sentenced unfairly during the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
period, it is imperative to understand clemency’s workings and
benefits, criticisms, and recent trend of disuse. The executive
clemency power is firmly rooted in the U.S. Constitution: “[The
President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
52
Impeachment.” The Founders adapted the clemency power from the
53
English Crown’s power to grant pardons at its complete discretion.

50. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (6th
ed. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has seldom had to consider how much res judicata effect is
necessary.”).
51. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 693 (2004) (“[R]etroactive
statutes may upset settled expectations.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)
(“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced.”); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (“[T]he choice between
retroactivity and nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee
involved.”).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
53. Washington Journal: History of Presidential Pardons (C-SPAN television broadcast
Dec. 27, 2008); see also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974) (noting that the Founders
“were well acquainted with the English Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it
existed in 1787”). Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the clemency power as an executive act of
grace. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1883). According to Justice Holmes, “[w]hen
granted[, clemency] is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be
better served.” Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). The notion of “making
exceptions . . . for the defendant’s unusually hard circumstances” goes back as far as the laws of
Hammurabi and classical Rome. Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral
Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (citing Andrew Brien,
Mercy Within Legal Justice, 24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 83, 83 n.2 (1998)).
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Executive clemency is a broad term that includes pardons
(forgiveness of both crime and punishment), commutations
(substitution of a milder punishment), and reprieves (postponement
54
of punishment). Clemency is a presidential prerogative that is not
55
subject to legislative control; in fact, the president has “wide
discretion, subject primarily to the constraints of the political process
56
and the president’s own personal sense of moral integrity.” The
scope of this authority is extremely broad, covering “every offence
57
known to the law.” The president is not limited by any statutory bars
and has the freedom to exercise his power at any time, “either before
legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after
58
conviction and judgment.”
Furthermore, the president has
significant leeway to devise the format of the pardon, which can be
59
“conditional[] or absolute[].” Although the president is not required
to disclose the reasons for granting clemency—and such reasons vary
from president to president—a study conducted in 1993 showed that
47 percent of pardon grants were due to possible innocence, 16
percent for mental illness or juvenile status, 11 percent for unfair
trials, 11 percent for disproportionate sentencing, 5 percent for
rehabilitation, 5 percent due to a request from the Pope, and no
60
reason was given in 5 percent of cases.
The clemency power of a state governor is found in that
particular state’s constitution, and it can usually be exercised in “[a]ny
61
way [the governor] wants.” Approximately thirty-three states have
appointed their governors as the sole decisionmaker regarding
clemency, while the rest have some form of clemency board
62
appointed by the governors. Reasons for using a clemency board

54. ADAM C. ORTIZ, AM. BAR ASS’N, CLEMENCY AND CONSEQUENCES: STATE
GOVERNORS AND THE IMPACT OF GRANTING CLEMENCY TO DEATH ROW INMATES 1 (2002).
55. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866).
56. Morison, supra note 53, at 31.
57. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380.
58. Id.
59. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
60. ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 1.
61. Daniel Engber, How Does a Governor Grant Clemency? With a Signed Note, SLATE,
(Nov. 30, 2005, 6:08 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2131268. The basis of this latitude of
discretion is rooted in its conceptualization “as an act of grace, a gift freely given.” KATHLEEN
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8–9 (1989). “Giftgiving is not something to criticize, analyze, scrutinize, demand, refuse, or justify.” Id. at 9.
62. Kavan Peterson, Governors Shy from Clemency Power, STATELINE.ORG (Jan. 30,
2003), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&content
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include “prevent[ing] the governor from being inundated with
applications, . . . insulat[ing] the governor during the application
process, and . . . provid[ing] a system that carefully evaluates the
63
merits of each application.”
In most cases, petitioners for clemency have to follow a set of
formal procedures before their applications reach the governor or the
64
president for possible consideration. At the federal level, the
65
Department of Justice has a set of rules for filing applications,
investigating the petitioner, dealing with victims, corresponding with
66
the public, and recommending a grant or denial to the president.
The Pardon Attorney, under the direction of the Deputy Attorney
67
General, receives and processes all petitions for clemency. If the
president does not respond within thirty days of the Pardon
68
Attorney’s recommendation, it is deemed accepted. Notwithstanding
these formal procedures, the president can grant clemency at will
69
without consulting anyone. At the state level, regulations vary from
70
state to state, with some states implementing formal application

Id=15145. Five states have clemency boards that make clemency decisions without the
governor’s participation: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and Texas. Id. The governor
grants clemency only on the basis of recommendations by the board in nine states: Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id. In
three states, Nebraska, Nevada, and Utah, the governor makes decisions with the board. Id.
63. Donald Leo Bach, To Forgive, Divine: The Governor’s Pardoning Power, WIS. LAW.,
Feb. 2005, at 12, 62.
64. Some cases come to the attention of the president through informal channels. The
president is not bound by formal executive clemency procedures. See, e.g., Engber, supra note
61 (“[T]he president isn’t bound by the ‘official’ rules for presidential pardons.”).
65. For a detailed description of the procedures and roles of the officers involved, see U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorney’s Manual Standards for Consideration of Clemency
Petitions, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/petitions.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
66. Executive Clemency, 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.11 (2009). The authority of the Department of
Justice in the clemency process was granted by President Grover Cleveland on June 16, 1893.
GAILLARD HUNT, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND
FUNCTIONS 130 (1914) (ordering “all warrants of pardons and commutations of sentences . . . be
prepared and recorded in the Department of Justice”); see also Executive Clemency, 27 Fed.
Reg. 11,002, 11,002–03 (Oct. 30, 1962) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.11 (1975))
(describing the executive clemency process).
67. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.35–0.36.
68. Id. § 1.8(b).
69. The language of the Constitution makes no mention of limitations or specific
procedures to follow, “except in Cases of Impeachment,” in which the president lacks clemency
power. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
70. For a link to reports that provide a state-by-state description of the clemency process,
see CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY FOUND., Clemency Policy: State Clemency Resources,
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/clemencystates.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
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71

processes and others granting automatic consideration if certain
72
criteria are met.
1. Support for Executive Clemency. The executive clemency
73
power is a flexible “fail safe” devised in recognition of the fallibility
74
of the criminal justice system. Although the clemency power would
75
“be redundant in a perfect administration,” imperfect laws will
continue to give rise to cases with “harsh, unjust, or popularly
76
unacceptable results.” Due to the complexity of the criminal justice
system and its inescapable dependence on human interpretation and
passion, it is vulnerable to error and abuse; executive clemency is a
77
backup system to mitigate some of these consequences. Such a failsafe reflects an acknowledgment of uncertainty and a preference for
78
leniency in assigning punishment by signaling when the criminal law
and the Sentencing Guidelines are too harsh, inflexible, or otherwise

71. Examples include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, and
West Virginia. Id. (follow appropriate hyperlink).
72. Alabama is an example. Id. (follow “Alabama” hyperlink).
73. Cf. James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Address at
the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
17, 17 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is impossible for any general law to
foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore an inflexible adherence
to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very great injustice.”).
74. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
75. CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 111 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, Virginia Cox & Richard
Bellamy trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764).
76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES 298 (1939).
77. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
281, 284 (1993). Justice Anthony Kennedy endorses executive clemency and urges the American
Bar Association to “consider a recommendation to reinvigorate the pardon process at the state
and federal levels.” JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, resolution 121C (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/rep
121c.pdf; see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (“[T]he traditional remedy for claims of innocence
based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been
executive clemency.”).
78. See Alan M. Dershowitz, What’s Mercy Got to Do with It?, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV.,
July 16, 1989, at 7 (“[I]n a world in which errors are inevitable, it is better to err on the side of
overly lenient, rather than overly harsh, punishment.”). This can be inferred from amendments
V, VI, and XIV to the U.S. Constitution and the criminal defendant’s presumption of innocence
until proven guilty. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law.”).
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79

in need of change. A corollary consequence to such a fail-safe role is
the preservation of public confidence in the legal system in spite of its
80
occasional tendency to produce arbitrary or disparate results.
In circumstances in which relief is warranted, but unavailable
through other means, “a chief executive’s failure to
81
intervene . . . would be a fitting object of moral opprobrium.” As
Justice Iredell said in 1788, “there may be many instances where,
though a man offends against the letter of the law, yet peculiar
82
circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy.” He further
noted that the president’s “duty [is] to watch over the public safety,”
which the president can accomplish by exercising the clemency
83
power. Margaret Love, a former Pardon Attorney, asserts that “the
president has a duty to pardon, not just where moral desert has been
established in a particular case, but also as a more general obligation
84
of office.” Justice Holmes declared that clemency “is part of the
Constitutional scheme. . . . [I]t is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less
85
than what the judgment fixed.”
This judicial recommendation of clemency is more than a cry for
mercy for any particular defendant. In fact, “this kind of adjustment
to a criminal sentence does not necessarily amount to a genuine act of
86
mercy.” Rather, it is “an equitable ‘bending’ of the rules in order to
achieve a morally just result, taking into consideration all morally
relevant facts concerning the defendant and the commission of the
87
offense.” Alexander Hamilton wrote that “without an easy access to
79. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 594
(2001); see also Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential Powers: A
Reply to Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1399 (2006).
80. Presidential Pardon Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14 (2001) (statement of Daniel T. Kobil, Professor, Capital
University Law School).
81. Morison, supra note 53, at 23.
82. Iredell, supra note 73, at 17.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1506 (2000).
85. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
86. Morison, supra note 53, at 25; see also Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486 (“A pardon in our days is
not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the
Constitutional scheme.”).
87. Morison, supra note 53, at 25. Legal and moral issues converge when considering
liability outside the context of pardons as well. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
EC 7–8 (2009) (“[I]t is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to
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exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
countenance too sanguinary and cruel” and clemency is “a mitigation
88
of the rigor of the law.” A beneficiary of executive clemency urges
that clemency be used to correct overly severe punishments and to
give offenders a second chance:
Today, I could be in federal prison still serving my 24-year sentence.
Instead, I’ve been raising my now 13-year-old son, graduated from
college in 2002 and completed a year of law school. . . . [The
president’s] clemency power should be used with thoughtful
deliberation. Even so, it should be utilized because clemency is
sometimes the only possible response to unfair and excessive
89
penalties.

Executive clemency also plays a role in current death penalty
90
debates. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the law
“draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
91
mark the progress of a maturing society.” Justice Scalia wrote in
another case that the “[r]eversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal
or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through
executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its
92
success.” From a historical perspective, “[a]mong the World War II
traitors, some were sentenced . . . to death, but by the grace of
93
executive clemency, none were actually executed.” Since 1976,
94
clemency has been granted to state death-row inmates 245 times.

a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.”); June Fabian Witt, Contingency,
Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, J. TORT L., 2007, at 1, 25–26 (“[B]oth the
strict liability and negligence principles offer plausible strategies for economically functional
and morally just approach to liability determinations.”). But see Joshua Wirth, Note, Federal
Regulation and Legislation in the Wake of the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: A Legal
Philosophical Analysis of Federal Government Responses to Market Bubbles, 14 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 179, 207–09 (2008) (arguing that just because government regulations in
response to the meltdown may be morally unjust does not mean the law failed).
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447–49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
89. Kemba Smith, The Wisdom of Pardons, AM. F. (Dec. 19, 2008, 08:22 AM),
http://amforumbacklog.blogspot.com/2008/12/wisdom-of-pardons.html.
90. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
91. Id. at 2649.
92. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and
Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1500
(2009).
94. Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency
(last visited Aug. 30, 2010). Of this total, 172 were granted in Illinois, with the majority of states
having granted one or two. Id.
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Moreover, “[c]lemency petitions are a rich resource in the
investigation of death penalty litigation because they go beyond the
legal system to include evidence which may have been barred or
95
excluded in prior habeas corpus appeals.” As Chief Justice Roberts
stated in response to Senator Russ Feingold’s question about the risk
96
of innocent persons receiving death sentences, “[T]here is always a
risk in any enterprise that is a human enterprise like the legal
97
system.” Thus, in accordance with the Chief Justice’s view, “it is
absolutely vital that . . . the convicted [be empowered] with the
98
procedural tools to fight their convictions.”
In abused-child parricide and battered-women cases in which the
law precludes using abused-child syndrome and battered-women
syndrome as defenses to premeditated killings, executive clemency
should be recommended because imprisonment of abused children
99
and battered spouses is not in line with criminal justice policy. One
commentator asks,
What is to be done about the many abused-child parricides currently
serving lengthy prison sentences? Such long-term incarceration is a
miscarriage of justice if the convicted parricide was denied a chance

95. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Public Access to State Clemency Petitions, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 176,
178 (2008).
96. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 365 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
97. Id. (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
98. Jonathan Aminoff, Something Very Wrong Is Taking Place Tonight: The Diminishing
Impact of the Actual Innocence Exception on Eligibility for the Death Penalty, 46 CRIM. L. BULL.
86, 136 (2010); see also Saad Gul, The Truth that Dare Not Speak Its Name: The Criminal Justice
System’s Treatment of Wrongly Convicted Defendants Through the Prism of DNA Exonerations,
42 CRIM. L. BULL. 687, 690 (2006) (“[F]ederal courts may not entertain habeas petitions on
grounds of actual innocence, unless the claim is coupled with an independent constitutional
violation. The[] only recourse may lie in executive clemency petitions.”(footnote omitted)).
99. See KATHLEEN M. HEIDE, WHY KIDS KILL PARENTS: CHILD ABUSE AND
ADOLESCENT HOMICIDE 143 (1992) (“Whenever possible the adolescent parricide offender
should not be imprisoned; prison psychological services are rarely adequate to deal with the
depth of his problems.”); Jessica L. Hart & Jeffrey L. Helms, Factors of Parricide: Allowance of
the Use of Battered Child Syndrome as a Defense, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 671, 680
(2003) (“[S]kepticism still remains of whether battered child syndrome is a legitimate
syndrome.”); Rebecca A. Olla, Redefining the Objectively Reasonable Person in Texas: A Case
for Battered Child Syndrome as Pure Self-Defense for Parricide, 17 TEX. ST. B. SEC. RPT. JUV. L.
5, 7–8 (2003) (advocating for the use of expert testimony on abused child syndrome in order to
help judges and juries evaluate the reasonableness of a child’s actions); Susan C. Smith, Abused
Children Who Kill Abusive Parents: Moving Toward an Appropriate Legal Response, 42 CATH.
U.L. REV. 141, 165 n.164 (1992) (“Governor Ed Herschler commuted [the child defendant’s]
prison sentence and ordered her on probation for one year.”).
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to establish self-defense by offering expert testimony of battered
child syndrome . . . . Executive clemency for those convicted abusedchild parricides who have already served considerable periods of
100
incarceration can solve this problem.

In the same vein, battered women who were denied an opportunity to
assert a defense could be saved by way of clemency. Missouri
Governor John Ashcroft commuted the sentences of two battered
women because “the law prohibited juries from hearing about the
101
severe abuse and trauma they endured.” Rather than leaving them
to serve out their entire life sentences, the governor restored the
102
possibility of parole.
John Locke summarizes the benefits of executive clemency
perhaps most succinctly:
[T]he Ruler should have a Power, in many Cases, to mitigate the
severity of the Law, and pardon some Offenders . . . [S]ince in some
Governments the Lawmaking Power . . . is usually too numerous,
and so too slow, . . . there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to
103
do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.

2. Stigmatization and the Decline of Clemency. Despite its critical
role in carrying out justice, the clemency power is often criticized for
104
its unreviewable “arbitrary [and] capricious” nature. The lack of
105
“procedural and substantive constraints” makes clemency appear to
106
be “[s]hroud[ed] . . . with a certain air of mystery.” The critics’ focus
is thus often not on “the substantive merits of particular cases,” but
107
rather on the procedure itself.
Two practical considerations

100. Robert Hegadorn, Clemency: Doing Justice to Incarcerated Battered Children, 55 J. MO.
B. 70, 78 (1999).
101. Virginia Young, Sentences Cut for 2 Who Killed Husbands, ST. LOUIS POST–DISPATCH,
Dec. 17, 1992, at 1A.
102. Id.
103. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 421–22 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
104. Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 181
(1988); see also Coleen E. Klasmeier, Note, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Clemency
and Procedural Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1535 (1995) (expressing unease about the
“potential for arbitrary decisionmaking that inheres in the unfettered clemency power”).
105. Hoffstadt, supra note 79, at 597
106. Morison, supra note 53, at 28.
107. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1350 (2008); Paul J. Haase, Note, “Oh My Darling Clemency”: Existing or
Possible Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287,
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intensify this air of mystery. First, clemency applicants have legitimate
108
interest in protecting their privacy from public scrutiny. The
petition process requires applicants to submit “often sensitive
biographical information about their character and activities,” and
109
the system needs to prevent public disclosure of such information.
Second, the lack of public scrutiny allows the president or governors
“to receive the frank and uninhibited advice of [their] legal and
110
political advisers.”
Even though the clemency process has largely remained
unchanged, criticism has grown in recent years. In the past, clemency
has mostly been regarded favorably, as “a safety valve in a legal
111
system that sometimes makes mistakes.” For example, between
1900 and 1989, a substantial number of clemency grants were issued
from month to month, as opposed to the recent trend of executives
112
clustering grants toward the end of their terms. The decline in the
number and consistency of clemency grants began with President
113
Richard Nixon. This decline is largely attributable to “two relatively
114
One gaining
new influences in the criminal justice system.”
115
momentum was “the retributivist theory of ‘just deserts,’” which
increased intolerance of sentencing reduction. The other, which
quickly caught the public’s attention, was “the politics of the ‘war on
116
crime.’” The combination of these two movements began to
decrease the frequency of clemency grants. Similarly, state governors
1298 (2002) (“The main concern that surfaced in light of the Clinton pardons is that President
Clinton bypassed the normal pardon procedures.”).
108. Morison, supra note 53, at 28.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. William Glaberson, States’ Pardons Now Looked at in Starker Light, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2001, at A1; see also supra notes 73–103 and accompanying text.
112. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., “Last-Minute” Pardon Scandals: Fact and Fiction 16–18, 22–27
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts
/Paper2.pdf (presenting graphs that show a fairly even distribution of pardons between each
month).
113. Id. at 25–26.
114. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 5, 7 (2007).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Love, supra note 84, at 1506 (“[T]he duty to pardon is neither grounded in
nor limited by considerations of law or morality, but is essentially one of politics.”); P.S.
Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development and Analysis
(1900–1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 258 (1997) (“[W]hen explaining an
administration’s use of clemency powers, the partisan identification and political ideology of the
president cannot be ignored.”).
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reduced clemency grants for fear of being criticized as being “soft on
117
crime and . . . siding against the victims.” At the federal level, the
political and social pressure to be “tough on crime” was exacerbated
by Attorney General Griffin Bell’s reforms of the Department of
Justice, which “delegate[d] the clemency advisory responsibility to
118
subordinate officials,” including prosecutors. In the hands of federal
prosecutors, clemency recommendations to the president further
119
declined.
In addition to retributivist theory and political rhetoric, the
prevalent view that “the system is open to special pleading or outright
120
abuse” has added to the decline in grants of clemency. Stories like
121
122
those of Carma Storcella, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Oklahoma
123
124
Governor J.C. Walton, and Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste
contribute to the stigma. President George H.W. Bush granted a mere
seventy-seven clemencies during his four years in office and President
Bill Clinton only fifty-six during his first term, although he granted
125
313 during the last year of his second term. President George W.
126
Bush granted a total of only 200 during his two terms. At the state
level, taking California as an example, clemency grants drastically
decreased from 1967 to the present day, with Governor Ronald

117. Peterson, supra note 62.
118. Love, supra note 114, at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Glaberson, supra note 111 (“The controversy over the Clinton pardons has highlighted
a concern that clemency orders nationally are often based on inconsistent or unfair policies.”).
121. Carma Storcella was pardoned by New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman. The
media later revealed that she was an “aunt of the director of the casino commission’s division of
licensing, Christopher Storcella.” Id.
122. Love, supra note 114, at 5 (“[T]he Libby commutation in context seemed to confirm
the popular view of pardon as a personal prerogative of the president, a remnant of tribal
kingship generally reserved for the well-heeled or well-connected.”); see also Amy
Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at A1 (“Shortly
after Libby was convicted in March, three national public opinion polls found that seven in 10
Americans said they would oppose a pardon of Libby.”).
123. Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton was removed from office for selling pardons. 100
Years of Oklahoma Governors, OKLA. DEP’T OF LIBRARIES, http://www.odl.state.ok.us/oar/
governors/Walton.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
124. Former Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste aroused public contempt for granting
clemency to sixty-eight individuals at the end of his second term. See generally Daniel T. Kobil,
Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1991) (discussing the
political controversy surrounding Celeste’s grants of clemency).
125. Ruckman, supra note 112, at 21.
126. Bush Grants Clemency to Ex-Border Guards, CBS NEWS.COM (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/19/politics/main4735156.shtml.
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Reagan granting 575 from 1967 to 1975, Governor Wilson granting
thirteen from 1999 to 2003, and Governor Gray Davis granting zero
127
from 1999 to 2003.
The clemency-to-execution ratio is another way to measure
128
clemency rates. As of July 2002, the national clemency-to-execution
129
ratio is 6.14 percent, or one clemency per sixteen executions. Nine
states have ratios above the national average: Illinois (8.33 percent),
Florida (11.76 percent), Georgia (17.24 percent), North Carolina
(23.81 percent), Montana (50 percent), Maryland (66.67 percent),
Idaho (100 percent), Ohio (200 percent), and New Mexico (500
130
percent). However, twenty-three states have ratios below that
131
national ratio. Texas has one of the lowest ratios in the United
States, with 0.37 percent, or one clemency per 272 executions;
Oklahoma’s ratio is 2 percent, with one clemency per fifty executions;
and Missouri’s is 3.51 percent, with one clemency per twenty-eight
132
executions. Sixteen of the twenty-three states with lower ratios have
133
a ratio of 0 percent. As such, for the convicted, “pardon is regarded
134
as a constitutional anomaly.”

127. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, 2005-R-0065, RESEARCH REPORT, PARDON STATISTICS FROM OTHER STATES
(2005), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0065.htm. Although the statistics on California
are the most thorough, some data from other states suggest that current governors are less likely
to grant pardons than their recent predecessors. Cf. id. (indicating potential decreases in
Minnesota, Ohio, and Florida).
128. See ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 4 (calculating a ratio of clemencies to executions
throughout the United States, in Texas, Missouri, and Oklahoma).
129. Id. This figure reflects that approximately six inmates were pardoned for every onehundred executed.
130. AM. BAR ASS’N, CLEMENCY AND CONSEQUENCES: STATE GOVERNORS AND THE
IMPACT OF GRANTING CLEMENCY TO DEATH ROW INMATES 8 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/jdpclemeffect02.pdf.
131. Id.
132. ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 4.
133. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 130, at 8.
134. Margaret Colgate Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of Pardoning, LITIGATION,
Winter 2006, at 25; see also Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George
Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2004)
(“During the 1990s, from one to three death row inmates were granted clemency every year in
the entire nation—compared to approximately sixty to eighty executions each year. This is a
dramatic shift from several decades ago, when governors granted clemency in 20% to 25% of
the death penalty cases they reviewed. In Florida, one of the pillars of the ‘death belt,’
governors commuted 23% of death sentences between 1924 and 1966, yet no Florida death
penalty sentences were commuted in the 1990s.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Despite the public stigma and the fear of granting clemency, as a
group, presidents and governors seeking reelection have not been
135
adversely affected. Moreover, whether or not granting clemency
adversely affects an executive’s political popularity, “it is [the
executive’s] job to take risks and correct mistakes or unjust outcomes
136
in the legal system.” Unfortunately, the pervasive view is that the
executive clemency system today is “inefficient and unreliable, and
137
results in very few grants.” As a result of the general unwillingness
to grant clemency, individuals who received disproportionate
sentences cannot depend exclusively on the president or governors to
138
act.
III. A VIABLE SOLUTION: JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION TO
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
United States v. Booker ended an eighteen-year period of
mandatory injustice during which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
forced judges to impose sentences they found overly severe. Many
individuals who went through the criminal justice system during this
period are still serving out their sentences. This is similarly true for
139
individuals convicted in state courts under mandatory regimes.
Unfortunately, neither the legislative nor the executive branch can
independently provide a sufficient remedy. As discussed, legislative
reform is slow and adverse to retroactivity, and executive clemency is
stigmatized and seldom granted. The solution this Note proposes is
judicial recommendation of executive clemency. Under the current

135. See ORTIZ, supra note 54, at 2 (“Of the 15 governors who granted clemency since 1993,
only one was defeated for re-election (James) while three were re-elected or elected to higher
office (Carnahan re-elected Governor, Allen, Bush, Carnahan elected Senator). Five were
barred by law from seeking re-election (Wilder, Gilmore, Hunt, Glendening, Keating); two
retired (Edgar, Batt); and three face re-election in 2002 or 2004 (Huckabee, Easley, Barnes).”
(footnote and citation omitted)). But see MOORE, supra note 61, at 7 (“President Ford’s pardon
of Richard Nixon may have cost him reelection; several Governors have been impeached or
driven from office for abusing their power to pardon.”).
136. Peterson, supra note 62 (quoting Margaret Love, former U.S. Pardon Att’y, U.S.
Department of Justice).
137. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 113.
138. See Morison, supra note 53, at 11 (“[T]he reluctance of recent presidents to exercise the
clemency power more generously perhaps can be criticized for displaying a certain lack of moral
imagination and political courage, particularly given the advent in the last twenty years of strict
mandatory minimum statutes and rigid sentencing guidelines, together with a burgeoning
federal prison population.”).
139. See supra Part I.
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regime, judicial involvement in clemency is limited: it generally
happens only “when a sentencing judge is asked to make a
140
recommendation in a particular pardon case.” No law, explicitly or
implicitly, calls for any judicial involvement. But no law forbids such a
contribution. Thus, under current law and this Note’s proposal, judges
could recommend clemency at all procedural moments in a case—
including at sentencing, on appeal, upon receiving a habeas petition,
141
or during other collateral attacks.
Judicial participation in the executive clemency process is
valuable for three reasons. First, it would provide judges with an
additional tool to craft suitable sentences. Second, if clemency is
desirable—which this Note argues that it is—then judicial
recommendation of clemency would reinvigorate its use. Finally, it
helps to refocus clemency grants on the circumstances of the
defendants rather than on arbitrary political influences.
A. A Discretionary Tool for Judges to Correct Unjust Sentences
Enabling judges to appeal to the executive for clemency provides
the judiciary with a discretionary tool to correct injustice when it is
142
bound by law to do the contrary. This is most relevant for sentences
imposed during the eighteen-year period during which the Sentencing
Guidelines were mandatory. Until Booker made them advisory in
2005, the Sentencing Guidelines required judges to impose sentences
within a mandated range, regardless of whether the judges found the
sentences egregious under the circumstances. Even today, judges
have no recourse to reduce a term of imprisonment imposed during
143
that period. Recall the stories of Angelos, Harvey, and McDade. All
three were sentenced to extremely long prison terms mandated by the
Sentencing Guidelines—sixty-five and a half years, life, and twentyseven years, respectively—even though all three sentencing judges
140. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., see supra note 9, at 117.
141. Chief Judge Sachs recommended clemency at sentencing, and the decision was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 1991).
Judge Friedman appealed to the executive branch after hearing, and rejecting, McDade’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel on collateral review. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp.
2d 77, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2009). Judge Cassell recommended clemency at the sentencing stage of
Angelos. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1262–63 (D. Utah 2004).
142. See generally Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of PostConviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43
(1998) (reasoning that clemency could either be “an act of mercy” or “an instrument of
justice”).
143. See supra Part I.
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would have imposed shorter terms. In a last effort to prevent
injustice, all three judges appealed to the executive branch to grant
clemency. As a result of the wide latitude given to the president to
grant clemency, “it is presumably not unjust for a president to grant
clemency for the same sorts of reasons [as those relied upon by
judges], especially where a case is beyond the reach of further judicial
144
review.” The flexibility of the clemency power allows for the
retroactive modification of unjust sentences that judges were forced
145
by the pre-Booker Guidelines to impose.
The ongoing effort to pass legislation in Congress that would
reform sentencing procedures for federal courts confirms the
necessity of increasing judges’ discretion to guard against
disproportionate sentencing. Four major legislative proposals
exemplify Congressional attempts to restore sentencing discretion to
judges. First, the introduction of the Major Drug Trafficking
146
Prosecution Act of 2009 would eliminate the mandatory minimum
147
sentences imposed by the Controlled Substances Act and the
148
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act and return discretion
149
to judges. Second, the House of Representatives is considering the
Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, which would broaden
150
judicial discretion. The bill seeks to abolish the heightened penalties
and mandatory minimums for drug offenses involving cocaine
151
base —such as crack cocaine—and to dispose of limitations on
152
judges’ authority to grant probation and suspended sentencing.
153
Third, a proposed expansion of the safety valve of § 3553(f) puts
additional discretion back in judges’ hands by allowing deviations
144. Morison, supra note 53, at 25.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (recommending
executive clemency to modify a convicted person’s sentence).
146. Major Drug Trafficking Prosecution Act, H.R. 1466, 111th Cong. (2009).
147. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
148. Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Id. § 951.
149. H.R. 1466 (replacing various provisions reading “which may not be less than [x] years”
with “for any terms of years”).
150. Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act, H.R. 1459, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3245, 111th
Cong. (2009). Both bills are sponsored by Representative Robert Scott, D-VA. Bill H.R. 1459
was introduced in the House on March 12, 2009, and bill H.R. 3245 was introduced on July 16,
2009.
151. H.R. 1459; H.R. 3245.
152. H.R. 1459. In addition to eliminating the crack–powder cocaine sentencing disparity,
this bill calls for judicial discretion in other areas of drug sentencing. Id.
153. The safety valve allows judges to deviate below mandatory minimum sentences. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006).
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below mandatory sentences. Judges have applied the law as it stands
to adjust the sentences of 25 percent of all drug offenders to below
155
mandatory minimums. The proposal would broaden the reach of
the safety valve to “offenders whose criminal history points overstate
156
their actual risk of recidivism” and to nondrug offenders subject to
157
mandatory minimums. Finally, the Criminal Justice Transition
Coalition proposes a greater emphasis on sentencing alternatives to
158
incarceration, such as probation and community service. These
proposals would entrust judges with greater discretion in sentencing,
allowing them to carefully “craft sentences that more accurately
punish offenders based on the severity of their offense, their
159
culpability, and their criminal history.” The increased use of judicial
recommendation of executive clemency proposed by this Note
complements these current reforms.
B. Revitalization of Executive Clemency Grants
Increasing the use of the judicial power to recommend clemency
would contribute to the revitalization of the clemency process. As
discussed in Part II.B, grants of clemency have declined drastically in
recent history due to the stigma associated with the clemency power.
The popular view is that the clemency process is “cumbersome,
160
arbitrary, and capricious.” The decline in the use of the clemency
power is detrimental to the criminal justice system because clemency
provides the final “means of preventing manifest injustice caused by
the inherent inflexibility of the criminal law and the imperfections of
161
its human application.”

154. 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 38. This proposal will
become moot if either bill H.R. 1459, H.R. 1466, or H.R. 3245 are enacted into law. Each bill
would eliminate mandatory minimums, thereby rendering safety valves unnecessary.
155. Id.
156. Id. (“Due to the peculiarities of the sentencing guidelines’ criminal history provisions,
people who have been convicted of more than one very minor offense, such as driving on a
suspended license or passing a bad check, can be considered to have too much criminal
background to qualify for the safety valve.”).
157. Id. at 39, 41 (noting that crimes including gun offenses, sex crimes, and identity fraud
became subject to mandatory minimums without a safety valve).
158. Id. at 47–50.
159. Id. at 38.
160. Former Inmate Believes in the Power of Pardons (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2008),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98399545; see also supra
Part I.
161. Morison, supra note 53, at 26–27.
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Judicial recommendation of clemency is beneficial to both the
clemency process itself and its rejuvenation. Judicial recommendation
is valuable to the clemency process because the president
“presumably wants the fullest array of information regarding cases in
162
which a commutation might be appropriate.”
And judicial
recommendation helps revitalize clemency by adding legitimacy to
the executive’s decision to grant clemency. This happens on two
levels. First, by responding to judicial requests in some cases, an
executive receives the imprimatur of the courts and is thus able to
163
Second, judicial
provide legal reasons for its decisions.
recommendation may serve the system of checks and balances by
giving the judiciary the power to prod the executive to act when the
164
legislature has mandated excessively harsh sentencing requirements.
Helping to increase clemency grants by way of judicial
recommendation is not only viable and effective but also efficient.
The judges in Angelos, Harvey, and McDade recommended clemency
in their written opinions and requested that their opinions be sent to
165
the Office of the Pardon Attorney. Hence, judges would not need
additional resources to take this step: nothing needs to be done other
than writing the recommendation in the opinion and mailing it to the
Department of Justice or the appropriate state office.
C. Improvement of Equity in Clemency Grants
Judicial contribution to the clemency recommendation process
refocuses clemency grants on the particular defendant in a particular
case to increase the extent to which similarly situated defendants are
treated the same way. Typically, clemency grants are based on
“[p]olitical influences . . . includ[ing] . . . such factors as public
opinion, the social status of a petitioner and his/her supporters,
166
specific foreign policy concerns or the outbreak of war.” Other
commentators have referred to “the lawyers’ political affiliations and
ambitions, the status of the victim’s family, the proximity to a
162. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1261 (D. Utah 2004).
163. Murphy, supra note 104, at 162, 181.
164. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last
Pardons, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 217 (2003) (“[A]n unlimited power to make exceptions to the
law depends for its legitimacy upon a process that at least appears to limit it.”).
165. For the requests in each opinion, see United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378–79
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2009); Angelos, 345
F. Supp. 2d at 1230–31.
166. Ruckman, supra note 116, at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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gubernatorial election, and the perception that a governor is too soft
167
on crime.” Absent from these common considerations is a factor of
great import—the specific factual background of the defendant’s case.
The individual most familiar with the facts and circumstances of a
particular case is the sentencing judge, whose recommendation may
help reduce inconsistent or arbitrary clemency grants. This is largely
because judges are equipped with the knowledge to decide not only
on the severity of the crime, but also on the moral blameworthiness of
168
a particular offender. For example, “a person who compassionately
kills his terminally ill spouse to relieve her physical suffering ought to
be judged less harshly than someone who kills his spouse in order to
collect the proceeds of an insurance policy, even though both have
169
committed the crime of homicide.” Input by sentencing judges on
the use of clemency to reduce sentences to an appropriate level
provides judges with a critical tool to correct injustice and breathe life
back into clemency.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR CLEMENCY RECOMMENDATION
BY THE JUDICIARY
Judicial recommendation of executive clemency advances the
170
achievement of “a morally just result” by (1) providing judges with
a discretionary tool to correct harsh punishments; (2) revitalizing the
exercise of clemency on both the federal and state levels; and (3)
improving equitability in clemency grants by focusing sentence
modification via clemency on the defendant and the facts of the case
rather than on political influences. Having concluded that judicial
participation in executive clemency is valuable, this Part discusses
some of the relevant factors to consider when evaluating a case for
clemency recommendation.

167. Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 371
(2010) (footnotes omitted); see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency
in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 353–55 (2003) (discussing the
reasons judges have issued clemency for capital cases, including “to achieve justice or bestow
mercy” and “to prevent the loss of convictions and to conserve judicial resources”); Richard A.
Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 87–88 (2003) (“But clemency is, at bottom, a
political crapshoot that forces the innocent and guilty alike to rely on popularly elected
politicians, or their political appointees, to ensure that ultimate justice is done.”).
168. See Michael Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice Be Even-Handed?, 1 LAW & PHIL. 77, 86
(1982) (discussing how the circumstances of the crime may affect sentencing).
169. Morison, supra note 53, at 20–21.
170. Id. at 25.
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A. Miscarriage of Justice
When the justice system mandates overly severe penalties in
individual cases that cannot be corrected by other measures,
executive clemency is an effective way to correct the injustice. For
example, in Angelos, Judge Cassell reluctantly found that, although
the system malfunctioned, he had no recourse at the judicial level to
reduce a sentence that was “so grossly disproportionate to the
171
crime.” During the sentencing stage, Judge Cassell rigorously
evaluated all possible means of reducing Angelos’s unjust sentence,
including an equal-protection challenge and a claim that the sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
172
punishment, but he concluded that they were of no use in this case.
He found the sentence mandated by the gun statute, as applied to
173
Angelos, “cruel, unjust, and even irrational.” In Harvey, Chief
Judge Sachs found Harvey’s offense “not . . . serious enough to merit
174
imprisonment.” In McDade, even though Judge Friedman found the
175
sentence imposed on McDade “disproportionate,” the defendant
had no more recourse after losing his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
collateral claim. In these instances where the sentencing judges
perceive a miscarriage of justice, judicial recommendation of
executive clemency is highly valuable for ensuring proportionality in
the sentence imposed.
B. The Sentence Imposed Is Long
For administrative efficiency, only cases with long sentences
should be considered for clemency recommendation. This is not to
say that defendants who received shorter sentences are not as worthy,
but the clemency power should be exercised only when a substantial
portion of the defendant’s life will be spent in prison.
It is difficult to provide an absolute number, but McDade was
sentenced to twenty-seven years, Angelos to sixty-one and a half
years, and Harvey to life. Such long sentences should, at a minimum,
176
provoke a “sober second look.”
171. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004).
172. Id. at 1235–60.
173. Id. at 1230.
174. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Sachs, C.J., from
the Sentencing Transcript).
175. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009).
176. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 402.
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C. The Underlying Crime Is Nonviolent
Arguably, violent crimes pose greater danger to society at large
than nonviolent ones. Under each justification for criminal
punishment—retribution,
incapacitation,
deterrence,
and
177
rehabilitation —this seems to hold true. From a retributivist
perspective, society deems violent criminals more deserving of
punishment than nonviolent criminals due to the more serious
consequences that attend violent crimes. An example of how this
concern affects sentencing is the enactment of § 3553(f), which allows
178
for direct sentencing “point” reductions for nonviolent criminals in
179
the Sentencing Guidelines’ offense-level calculation. Turning to the
other justifications, the safety of other members of society makes the
incapacitation and deterrence of violent criminals more urgent than
the incarceration of nonviolent criminals. And although it is arguable
whether society’s interest in rehabilitating a criminal changes with the
degree of violence involved, rehabilitation can be considered here in
terms of the extent to which it is possible and successful. Prison is not
an ideal place for the rehabilitation of offenders due to the violence
180
and generally tense atmosphere prevalent there.
Nonviolent

177. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & BUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 21 (6th ed. 2008).
178. McDade exemplifies how the sentencing “point” system works:
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Base Offense Level for 150 kilograms
or more of cocaine is 38. Had Mr. McDade pled guilty, he would have received a
three level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Section
3E1. 1 of the Guidelines, to Offense Level 35. As part of the plea agreement, Mr.
McDade’s managerial role in the conspiracy, a three level upward adjustment under
Section 3B1.1, likely would have been negotiated away, leaving the Offense Level at
35. At Criminal History Category I, Mr. McDade’s sentence would have been
between 168 and 210 months. The Court would have imposed a sentence of 168
months.
McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
179. The statute, in relevant part, states that
the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission . . . without regard to any statutory minimum sentence,
if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the
opportunity to make a recommendation, that . . . the defendant did not use violence
or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2) (2006).
180. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994) (“[T]he penitentiary had a violent
environment and a history of inmate assaults . . . and petitioner . . . would be particularly
vulnerable to sexual attack.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (“Even a partial
survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation’s prisons illustrates the magnitude of the
problem. During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by
fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by
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criminals should not be forced to stay in such an environment for an
181
excessively lengthy period. Long prison terms for nonviolent
offenders may retard or prevent rehabilitation and may even
182
engender violent tendencies. In Angelos, Harvey, and McDade, the
sentencing judges considered the nonviolent nature of the defendants’
crimes in recommending clemency—Angelos: possession of marijuana
and possession, but not use, of weapons; Harvey: possession of crack
cocaine; and McDade: cocaine distribution. Other judges should
follow Judges Cassell, Sachs, and Friedman and consider the
nonviolent nature of the offense as a criterion for recommending
clemency.
D. The Punishment Is Disproportionate to the Sentences
Received by Codefendants
For the fair execution of criminal punishment, codefendants who
were similarly involved in the crime should be sentenced to similar
terms. For example, Judge Friedman noted in McDade,
prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these
facilities for the same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions.
Additionally, informal statistics from the United States Bureau of Prisons show that in the
federal system during 1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other
inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in
1981 and 1982 over 750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison
personnel.” (citations omitted)); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132
(1977) (“Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and
prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and
conflagration.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–62 (1974)).
181. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-1667, at 17 (1966) (“The net effect is to confine eligibility for
the benefits of the legislation to addicts accused of nonviolent crimes who show good prospects
for rehabilitation, while retaining strict criminal punishment for dangerous or hardened
offenders, narcotics pushers, and persons with a history of failure to respond to treatment.”);
Lauren M. Cutler, Note, Arizona’s Drug Sentencing Statute: Is Rehabilitation a Better Approach
to the “War on Drugs”?, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 397, 419 (2009)
(“[R]esearch conducted by experts in recent years has demonstrated that rehabilitation offers a
more comprehensive, long-term solution to nonviolent criminals . . . .”); Jing Tsang, Note,
California’s Drug Reform Policies: Past, Present, Future, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 887, 889 (2009)
(“Due to the increasing number of nonviolent criminals in its prison system, California has
made it a goal to reduce the number of nonviolent drug offenders in its prisons. It hopes to
reduce the overpopulated system by offering rehabilitation programs in lieu of
incarceration . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
182. S. REP. NO. 89-1667, at 17; Cutler, supra note 181, at 419; Tsang, supra note 181, at 889;
see also Note, Manufacturing Social Violence: The Prison Paradox & Future Escapes, 11
BERKLEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 84, 108 (2009) (“The prison is not a place where prisoners
rehabilitate. In fact, it seems that at a place like Terminal Island which is a middle security
Federal Prison, many prisoners come in for nonviolent crimes and soon find their personalities
shifting towards violence and survival.” (quoting an inmate)).
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While each of [the co-defendants] pled guilty and provided
substantial assistance to the government by testifying against Mr.
McDade (and some provided assistance in other ways), this sentence
is disproportionate. Indeed, had Mr. McDade not exercised his
constitutional right to a jury trial and instead pled guilty, the likely
sentence under even a mandatory Guideline regime would have
been approximately 168 months, approximately half the sentence
the Court was required to impose after Mr. McDade was found
183
guilty at trial.

In the interest of equity, substantial deviations of sentencing from
that imposed on codefendants should be a factor in considering
sentence reduction via executive clemency.
E. The Level of Punishment Is Inconsistent with the Nature of
the Offense
“Where two offences are in conjunction, the greater offence
ought to be subjected to severer punishment, in order that the
184
delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser.” This is the third
rule of thumb articulated in Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Legislation.
Although the Sentencing Guidelines and various other statutes
expend great efforts to adhere to this principle, these attempts
sometimes fail. One such failure is the recidivist enhancement for gun
possession under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), under which Angelos was
185
convicted. The enhancement was enacted with the purpose of
punishing offenders who repeatedly used weapons in subsequent
crimes after serving prior convictions. The law was also used,
186
however, to enhance the punishment of first-time offenders. The
Criminal Justice Transition Coalition proposed an amendment to the

183. United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009).
184. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1931) (1802) (emphasis omitted).
185. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1239–43 (D. Utah 2004) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)).
186. See 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (“For example,
a defendant who, over the course of three days, carried a gun while making three drug sales
(prosecuted in a single indictment resulting in three separate convictions) can be sentenced to a
minimum sentence of 55 years for the gun charges, plus whatever other sentences result from
the underlying conviction. This defendant, if convicted in one trial of three instances of carrying
a gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense, will be sentenced to (1) whatever sentence the
drug trafficking conviction carries; (2) a five-year mandatory minimum sentence consecutive to
the drug sentence, and (3) two 25-year mandatory minimum sentences consecutive to the drug
sentence, consecutive to the five-year mandatory minimum and consecutive to each other.”).
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law to clarify that offenders subject to this enhancement must be true
recidivists, to avoid sentencing “a twenty-four-year-old first
offender . . . to a mandatory consecutive term of 55 years based on his
three convictions in the same trial for simply possessing a firearm in
187
connection with small marijuana deals.” When judges find a
punishment that is technically required but clearly incompatible with
the purpose of the law, they should recommend clemency to the
executive.
F. Clean or Low-Level Criminal History
Society has less sympathy for repeat offenders than for first-time
offenders for many reasons. First, because “to err is human,” society
gives some leeway before harshly punishing individuals for their
offenses. Upon repeated warnings, however, the system draws a line
and severely punishes repeat offenders, as is reflected in California’s
188
189
three-strikes law and the gun statute implicated in Angelos.
Second, society is more willing to give first-time offenders a second
190
This willingness is
chance, especially for nonviolent crimes.
intertwined with the rehabilitative goal of the justice system and
reflects a belief that there is a greater likelihood of rehabilitation and
reentry back into society for first-time offenders. The consideration of
criminal history in sentencing calculations under the Sentencing
191
Guidelines illustrates this view, as does the consideration of
criminal-history level in deciding between sentences of incarceration
192
and probation. Finally, punishing first-time offenders less severely

187. Id. at 45.
188. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the Legislature . . . to
ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.”).
189. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
359, 393 (2005) (“Studies have shown, for example, that public opinion tends to be much more
punitive with regard to violent than nonviolent crimes.” (citing Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S.
Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 59 (2000))).
191. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines assign criminal-history levels based on the number
of offenses a defendant has committed prior to the offense being sentenced. The categories
range from I to VI, which puts defendants into different zones of potential incarceration lengths.
2009 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 22, at § 5A, sentencing tbl.
192. Pablo Martinez & Joycelyn M. Pollock, Impact of Type of Attorney on Sentencing, 44
CRIM. L. BULL. 652, 653 (2008) (“Research on sentencing has examined what factors go into the
decision to incarcerate versus giving the offender a ‘second chance’ with a community
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than recidivists is also in line with the deterrence and incapacitation
justifications. Arguably, recidivists require greater impediments to
deter and incapacitate because their repeated behavior shows a lack
of susceptibility to deterrence. Thus, judges should take an offender’s
criminal history into consideration when deciding whether to
recommend clemency.
G. Immaturity of Judgment
Though young offenders not within the age range of juveniles
should by no means be treated more leniently for their crimes, their
youth should be a factor in recommending clemency when some or
many of the other factors described are present. Both Harvey and
Angelos were twenty-four years old when convicted and sentenced to
193
194
life and sixty-one and a half years in prison, respectively. Harvey
had several minor drug offenses prior to his conviction and Angelos
195
had a clean criminal history. Sixty years is a long time for
punishment and provides bountiful room for rehabilitation, especially
196
for young people. Under these circumstances, judges should take
defendants’ immaturity of judgment into consideration.
H. Young Dependents and Future-Generation Consequences
The existing criminal justice system rarely takes familial
situations into account. Even though the Sentencing Guidelines
provide a downward departure for familial situations, it is rarely

supervision sentence. Obvious factors that have been examined include: crime of conviction,
criminal history, race, and gender.”).
193. United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378 (8th Cir. 1991).
194. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2004).
195. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
196. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 288 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]mportant
protections that the law has traditionally provided to youthful offenders because of
their . . . greater potential for rehabilitation [should be observed].”); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 398 (1987) (“The only mitigating circumstance [against the death penalty the
sentencing judge] found was petitioner’s youth.”); Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of
Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 91 (2009) (“Crimes
committed by still-developing young people, these scholars urge, are less blameworthy than
equivalent acts by adults; further, youths’ developmental plasticity makes them more likely to
stop offending—if, that is, we provide them with conditions conducive to rehabilitation.” (citing
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 13–16
(2008))).

HUANG IN FINAL

164

9/15/2010 11:54:40 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:131

197

applied. On the one hand, it is not difficult to comprehend why
familial conditions rarely warrant a departure; most defendants have
relatives whose lives would be affected by the defendants’
incarceration. Offenders with young, dependent children, however,
deserve closer examination. Take McDade, for example. He had four
children, all below the age of ten when he was incarcerated. He held
two jobs to support his family and was actively involved with the
children’s school and his community church. The court put McDade
198
in prison for twenty-seven years. The criminal justice system does
not take into account the effects of its laws on future generations of
children. Society does not gain much by incarcerating a child’s
nonviolent, first-time-offender father for the duration of the child’s
youth; rather, society may suffer a significant loss by creating
199
unproductive new members, or even new criminal offenders. Judges
could effectively remedy the lack of next-generation consideration in
the criminal justice system by considering the potential impact on the
convict’s children when deciding whether to recommend clemency.

197. 2009 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 22, at § 5H1.6 (“[F]amily ties and
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be
warranted.” (emphasis added)).
198. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Mogens Nygaard Christoffersen, Brian Francis & Keith Soothill, An
Upbringing to Violence? Identifying the Likelihood of Violent Crime Among the 1966 Birth
Cohort in Denmark, 14 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 367, 367 (2003) (“First-time
convicted offenders have an increased risk of coming from seriously disadvantaged
families . . . .”); DeAnna Pratt Swearingen, Comment, Innocent Until Arrested?: Deliberate
Indifference Toward Detainee’s Due-Process Rights, 62 ARK. L. REV. 101, 103 (2009) (“[E]arly
American scholars attributed deviant behavior to the poor upbringing of the offender and the
vices of the community.”); Crime: What The Country Really Thinks: Children’s Upbringing Seen
as Key to a Law-Abiding Society, INDEPENDENT (London), May 7, 1994, at 3 (“Raising the
moral climate started off as the most outstandingly popular tactic for tackling crime: teaching
children the difference between right from wrong was identified by more than 90 per cent of
people as one of the most effective ways of tackling crime, parents spending more time with
their children by 85 per cent and firmer discipline in schools by 83 per cent.”). Although the
sources cited above also speak to this point, the lyrics of a popular song may paint a clearer
picture:
Oh, there ain’t no rest for the wicked / Money don’t grow on trees / I got bills to pay /
I got mouths to feed / There ain’t nothing in this world for free. / I know I can't slow
down / I can’t hold back / Though you know, I wish I could / No there ain’t no rest for
the wicked / Until we close our eyes for good.
CAGE THE ELEPHANT, AIN’T NO REST FOR THE WICKED (Jive Records 2009) (quoting a
prostitute, a street robber, and an embezzler).

HUANG IN FINAL

2010]

9/15/2010 11:54:40 AM

CORRECTING MANDATORY INJUSTICE

165

CONCLUSION
Even though the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted with the
goal of mitigating “[d]isparity in sentencing” and establishing
200
“certainty of punishment,” they required sentences that judges
201
deemed unjust. Largely due to its flexibility, executive clemency is
an efficient method to cure individual injustices caused by the
malfunctioning of mandatory sentencing schemes. Judicial
recommendation of executive clemency gives judges the discretion to
call specific cases to the attention of the executive branch for
clemency consideration.
That said, judicial recommendation of clemency is not limited to
correcting sentences imposed during the mandatory-injustice period.
Due to sentencing judges’ familiarity with their cases and the
flexibility of executive clemency, judicial recommendation of
executive clemency could play a significant role in revitalizing and
202
reinvigorating clemency grants at both the federal and state levels.
Given the usefulness of executive clemency as a last resort for justice,
its current unpopularity and declining use represents a loss to the
criminal justice system. Judicial approval of clemency grants can help
revive clemency by providing an additional level of legitimacy.
Furthermore, judicial recommendation of clemency improves
equitability in clemency grants by focusing sentence modifications on
the defendant and the facts of the case rather than on political
influences. Thus, a more frequent use of clemency recommendations
by the judiciary can play a significant role in correcting injustice and
avoiding disproportionate sentences.

200. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION 1 (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSC_overview_200906.pdf.
201. See supra Part I.
202. See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text.

